NOAA Reponse to Indian Ocean Tsunami

Subject: [AMS_PSL] Tsunami Report (1.1-1.3)
Date: Mon, 07 Mar 2005 09:25:06 -0500
From: "R. Gary Rasmussen" <grasmussen@ametsoc.org>
To: "R. Gary Rasmussen" <grasmussen@ametsoc.org>

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=================================
Message 1.1, from Barry Lee Myers
=================================

Dear Members of the Commercial Weather Industry,

Below is a report about the Indian Ocean Tsunami you might find of interest.

Barry

TSUNAMI REPORT -- January 27, 2005 -- updated FEBRUARY 14, 2005

Below is information posted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) on its web site about the Indian Ocean Tsunami and
related preparedness issues of the agency. I have embedded some comments in
the NOAA text, designated with [ ] and highlighted in yellow. In addition,
I have the following thoughts.

{AMS_PSL Moderator's Note: the yellow highlighting that Barry Lee Myers
added to his message did not carry through to this message. Consequently,
his comments will appear in square brackets along with his initials, like
this: [BLM: ...].}

NOAA seems to be explaining that it did all it could in the recent tsunami
and appears to be proud of its effort during the event. However, it seems
that with appropriate forethought and preparedness, warnings would have
been issued as much as an hour or two in advance of the tsunami hitting
many of the coastal areas and people of the Indian Ocean basin.

Reading the NOAA account, one could receive the impression that a problem
was NOAA's ability or inability to confirm that a tsunami was actually
heading toward Indian Ocean beaches. If NOAA's position was to wait to
confirm that a tsunami actually was generated, so as not to issue a "false
alarm," the position was flawed at the outset and destined to cost lives.

In the face of one of the largest recorded undersea earthquakes on the
planet in 40 years, prudent practice should have been to warn of its
possibility and potential, not to wait for confirmation of a tsunami.

NOAA says, "It tried to get the message out of such a possibility." This
suggests that NOAA did indeed recognize a need to warn, even without
confirmation that a tsunami had been generated. Yet, the agency appears to
have recognized the need to warn too late, and was unprepared to act with
precision and timeliness to even communicate the potential of the greatest
natural disaster of a lifetime.

Unlike a hurricane threatening Florida, where evacuation could take 24 to
48 hours, many of the lives lost from the tsunami could have been saved by
people hearing of the danger and taking 15 to 30 minutes moving to higher
ground and waiting for an hour or two to see if the wave materialized.

NOAA manages an annual budget of about $4.0 billion. Of that, it spends
hundreds of millions of dollars yearly to support general public forecasts
such as "warm and sunny today" and to create products and services that
duplicate those already available from the Commercial Weather Industry in
the private sector. This duplicative commercial activity, and routine and
general daily forecasting, goes on while critical life and property
concerns, infrastructure development and maintenance, catastrophic event
preparedness, and other critical core mission functions, appear relegated
to secondary status.

This process of spending to duplicate private-sector commercial activities,
instead of focusing on core mission necessities, is not a new issue. The
Commercial Weather Industry has given voice to this important concern for
years. Had NOAA been properly focused on saving lives, a different result
surely would have transpired. NOAA systems for rapid recognition of large
magnitude undersea earthquakes would have been in place, tsunami warning
protocols to assess and warn would have been in place, operational false
alarm detection buoys would have been in place, and modern communication
links would have been in place.

NOAA could have easily communicated its warning on established
communications facilities that are monitored 24/7 around the world. The
Commercial Weather Industry and the news media would have picked it up.
People at hotels along the beaches and in foreign resorts would have seen
it on satellite news channels. Many would have had a chance for survival.
Worldwide goodwill towards America's proactive alert effort would have been
realized.

The loss of life in the tsunami was appalling. The tsunami was not
preventable; it was an inevitable natural force.

An agency charged with using the latest in science and technology to make
information and warnings available that would save lives, but was diverted
and unprepared to do either, was preventable.

NOAA, a federal science agency facing budget cuts, cannot waste resources
on duplicative efforts already well served by the Commercial Weather
Industry. This operational misdirection undermines the Commercial Weather
Industry, negatively impacting the American economy. Further, as supported
by the NOAA account of the tsunami, ill-defined and unreliable protocols,
systems, and preparedness, do not provide the desirable international
leadership and the needed protection to Americans at home and abroad.

(SEE NOAA REPORT BELOW)

Barry Lee Myers
Executive Vice President
AccuWeather, Inc

NOAA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI

Dec. 29, 2004 - NOAA scientists at the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in
Hawaii went to work within minutes of getting a seismic signal that an
earthquake occurred off the west coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia. NOAA
issued a bulletin indicating no threat of a tsunami to Hawaii, the West
Coast of North America or to other coasts in the Pacific Basin-the area
served by the existing tsunami warning system established by the Pacific
rim countries and operated by NOAA in Hawaii. (Click NOAA image for larger
view of tsunami buoy being deployed in the Pacific Ocean from the NOAA ship
Ronald H. Brown. Click here for high resolution version, which is a large
file. Please credit "NOAA.")

NOAA scientists then began an effort to notify countries about the
possibility that a tsunami may have been triggered by the massive 9.0
undersea earthquake. The Pacific Basin tsunami warning system did not
detect a tsunami in the Indian Ocean since there are no buoys in place
there. Even without a way to detect whether a tsunami had formed in the
Indian Ocean, NOAA officials tried to get the message out to other nations
not a part of its Pacific warning system to alert them of the possibility
of a tsunami. However, the tsunami raced across the ocean at speeds up to
500 mph. Below is the timeline of agency's actions once the undersea
earthquake was detected by the NOAA Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in
Hawaii. (All times listed below are Hawaii Standard Time or HST.)

At 2:59 p.m. Hawaii Standard Time (HST) on Christmas Day a large earthquake
occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, Indonesia.

At 3:07 p.m. the resulting seismic signals received at the NOAA Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) from stations in Australia triggered an alarm
that alerted watchstanders. [BLM: This appears to be when The Discovery
Channel reported a call went out from the unmanned PTWC to a staff member
who received it on his cell phone and got on his bicycle to peddle over to
the PTWC.]

At 3:10 p.m. PTWC issued a message to other observatories in the Pacific
with its preliminary earthquake parameters. [BLM: This appears to be the
automated alert that The Discovery Channel story referenced.]

At 3:14 p.m. PTWC issued a bulletin providing information on the earthquake
and stating there was no tsunami threat to the Pacific nations that
participate in the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (ITSU). These
member nations are part of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission (IOC) and the International Coordination Group for the Tsunami
Warning System in the Pacific (ICG/ITSU). India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives
are not part of the Pacific system.

At 4:04 p.m. PTWC issued bulletin No. 2 revising the earthquake magnitude
to 8.5. That bulletin stated no tsunami threat to the Pacific but
identified the possibility of a tsunami near the epicenter. No additional
information regarding the formation of a tsunami was available. [BLM: Note
that this is already 65 minutes after the quake occurred. Many islands and
land areas had already been wiped out -- note this NOAA statement suggests
the tsunami was moving at 500 mph.]

At approximately 4:30 p.m. HST PTWC attempted to contact the Australia Met
Service with no luck but were successful in contacting Australia Emergency
Management. They confirmed they were aware of the earthquake. [BLM: This is
91 minutes after the event -- the tsunami had already traveled at least 750
miles from its point of origin, using NOAA's speed of travel estimate. How
could NOAA have "no luck" contacting one of the major and more
sophisticated meteorological services in the world in Australia? Also, when
the contact finally happened, all that NOAA appears to have been able to do
was "confirm" that the earthquake happened.]

At approximately 5:30 p.m. Internet newswire reports of casualties in Sri
Lanka provided PTWC with the first indications of the existence of a
destructive tsunami. Indications are that the tsunami had already struck
the entire area by this time, although we have not been able to obtain
arrival times. [BLM: NOAA says that the tsunami was moving at 500 mph, Sri
Lanka was about 1000 miles, and the Indian Coast was about 1250 miles, from
the quake epicenter. This would suggest, using NOAA's speed and the
distance, that a tsunami, could approach Sri Lanka at about 5:00pm, and the
Indian Coast at about 5:30pm.]

At approximately 5:45 p.m., armed with knowledge of a tsunami, PTWC
contacted the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii.

At approximately 5:45 p.m., PTWC received a call from a Sri Lanka Navy
Commander inquiring about the potential for further tsunami waves from
aftershocks.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. the U.S. Ambassador in Sri Lanka called PTWC to
set up a notification system in case of big aftershock. He said they would
contact Sri Lanka Prime Minister's office for such notifications.
Continuing news reports gave increasing and more widespread casualties.

At approximately 7:25 p.m. the first reading from the Australian National
Tidal Center gauge at Cocos Island west of Australia gave a reading of 0.5m
crest-to-trough.

At 7:25 p.m. the Harvard University Seismology Department reported its
preliminary Centroid Moment Tensor solution that indicated a magnitude of
8.9.

At approximately 7:45 p.m. PTWC contacted the Australia Bureau of
Meteorology and advised them about the increased earthquake magnitude and
the 0.5m reading at Cocos Island, as well as the possibility of a
destructive tsunami impact on Australia's west coasts.

At approximately 8:00 p.m. PTWC re-contacted PACOM to advise of increased
earthquake magnitude and potential for further tsunami impacts in the
western Indian Ocean.

At approximately 8:15 p.m. Australia Bureau of Met called PTWC to advise
they had issued an alert to their west coast.

At approximately 8:20 p.m. NOAA National Weather Service Pacific Region
director contacted PTWC to report PACOM said no tsunami was observed at
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

At approximately 10:15 p.m. PTWC spoke with U.S. State Department
Operations and advised them about the potential threat to Madagascar and
Africa. They set up a conference call with the U.S. embassies at Madagascar
and Mauritius, and PTWC advised them of the situation.

At 5:36 a.m. on December 27 PTWC issued a third Tsunami Information
Bulletin for this event informing the Pacific that small sea level
fluctuations from the Indian Ocean tsunami were being observed in the
Pacific, probably from energy that wrapped around south of Australia.

The Pacific Warning System Pacific warning network is comprised of (1)
hundreds of seismic stations
worldwide; (2) coastal tide gauges and sophisticated Deep-ocean Assessment
and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoys in the Pacific Basin capable of
detecting a centimeter's difference in ocean height. However, it is
important to note that without similar gauges and buoys in the Indian Ocean
PTWC officers were not in a position to detect a tsunami there. [BLM: The
probability that a magnitude 8.9 earthquake, (the size of which should have
been quickly clear from the "hundreds" of seismic stations in NOAA's
network), would generate a tsunami, was a clear possibility. To say that
PTWC was not in a position to "detect" a tsunami in the Indian Ocean
without gauges and buoys in the Indian Ocean is correct, but to say that a
warning could not have been issued based on one of the largest undersea
earthquakes in 40 years, suggests that NOAA is just an information
reporting agency, not a forecasting one. Do they wait for a hurricane to
pass over a city to then predict that there may be a hurricane to hit land?
This was an agency ill equipped to react to the quickly transpiring events
that called for the issuance of a warning based on the probability of a
catastrophic event.]

NOAA's Responsibility to the International Community

The U.S. has demonstrated the effectiveness of its warning system within
the Pacific region. It has also demonstrated that the warning system can
provide initial earthquake information to other nations and is most willing
to share that information with all concerned. With national dissemination
and water
level networks in place, NOAA's information can be used to mitigate future
disasters.

It is also important to recognize that tsunamis can come ashore within
minutes of nearby earthquakes. In those instances, people must know what to
do in the event of a "felt" earthquake in low lying coastal areas.

The need for a tsunami warning program outside the Pacific region has been
raised since 1985 with little result. It now appears that there is new
interest in this issue within the international ICG/ITSU community. The
U.S. strongly supports such an effort. [BLM: NOAA has a budget of over $4.0
billion annually, warning buoys cost about $250,000 each, and it has been
estimated that $36 million, according to recent news reports, may be the
initial price tag to establish a tsunami detecting buoy deployment for a
U.S. homeland system. Such a system will confirm the existence or lack
thereof of a tsunami, not necessarily aid significantly in the ability of
NOAA to predict and warn]

Furthermore, the development of the Global Earth Observing System of
Systems (GEOSS) led by the United States, Japan, South Africa and the
European Commission-with 53 nations currently participating at the
ministerial level-should help fill the sensor gap for other regions of the
world. Two key focus areas of the GEOSS initiative are addressing "reducing
loss of life and property due to disasters" and "monitoring our oceans."

NOAA is dedicated to enhancing economic security and national safety
through the prediction and research of weather and climate-related events
and providing environmental stewardship of the nation's coastal and marine
resources. NOAA is part of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Source: http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2004/s2358.htm

============================
Message 1.2, from DL Johnson
============================

I appreciate the opportunity afforded by AMS to respond to Mr. Myers
remarks regarding the tragic tsunami event in the Indian Ocean. I am sure
those who subscribe to this AMS listserver, and perhaps others who may
receive this in a forwarded message, will be interested in having all of
the facts at their disposal to inform their views.

This is the latest in a series of "form letters" from Mr. Myers which
routinely include the following claims: (1) NOAA provides environmental
information services which it should not provide, since this information
"competes" with or duplicates private sector offerings. (2) NOAA spends
"hundreds of millions" providing this inappropriate information. (3) NOAA
would have provided better (fill in the blank) if it stopped providing this
inappropriate information. Mr. Myers uses this "all purpose" argument
whenever any service provided by NOAA (hurricane forecasts, tsunami
warnings, etc.) fails to meet his expectations -- regardless of whether
these expectations are reasonable and well-informed or not. In this case
he has applied this argument to the assertion that NOAA could have / should
have
responded differently during the tragic tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

Our response to this latest "form letter" from Mr. Myers follows in two
parts: The next section addresses NOAA's tsunami services. The final
section addresses his other two main points.

NOAA's tsunami warning program:

This is not a good forum to serve as a primer on tsunamis -- a complex and
occasionally devastating natural phenomenon. Briefly, an effective tsunami
mitigation program has many parts -- real-time observations of seismic
activity and the resulting ocean wave, an analysis and warning center to
analyze these data, dissemination systems capable of reaching at-risk
populations, and preparedness activities so people can take effective
action to save lives. Some of these parts existed in the Indian Ocean on
December 25/26, 2004, but many did not.

NOAA carried out its specific tsunami warning functions in the Pacific
Ocean admirably on December 25/26. Although NOAA has no specific
responsibilities for tsunami warnings in the Indian Ocean, we also tried to
help out there despite limitations in the preparations for an Indian Ocean
tsunami.

Those who want more complete background on the technical and institutional
underpinnings of NOAA's tsunami warning capabilities may wish to begin with
the web sites of NOAA's tsunami warning centers for the Pacific (
http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/ ) and West Coast / Alaska (
http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/ ).

Although Mr. Myers claims no expertise in tsunami dynamics, he has seen fit
to malign the performance of NOAA's tsunami warning system and use this
global tragedy to attempt to advance a personal policy agenda. Therefore
the remainder of this response is focused on NOAA's policies with regard to
the environmental information services we provide.

Policy Issues:

On December 1, 2004, NOAA issued a Policy on Partnerships in the Provision
of Environmental Information ( http://www.noaa.gov/partnershippolicy/ )
which will provide the interested reader with a more complete discussion of
the policy context. Briefly put, the Paperwork Reduction Act and other
laws require NOAA and all Federal agencies to actively disseminate
taxpayer-funded information. NOAA's new Partnership Policy implements
these laws within NOAA and commits us to consult with all interested
parties, including commercial weather service companies, before making a
significant change to NOAA's environmental information services --
disseminating new types of information or changing (including terminating)
existing information services. As the Policy states, "NOAA has specific
mission responsibilities as part of this enterprise, and NOAA also has a
responsibility to foster the growth of this complex and diverse enterprise
as a whole and to serve the public interest and the Nation's
economy." This is precisely what we try our very best to do, and we
believe this policy serves the public and all parties in the nation's
environmental information enterprise -- including AccuWeather, who directly
benefits from the taxpayer funded information it gets for free. That's why
the United States has the world's largest private environmental information
sector.

We have yet to publish detailed procedures under the Policy for terminating
particular NOAA information. However, if Mr. Myers, or anyone else, wishes
to make specific suggestions regarding information he believes we should
terminate, we are happy to entertain them. But we will not create
artificial barriers to convenient use by all of the information we produce
at taxpayer expense.

And we cannot generate the alerts and warnings Mr. Myers so applauds
without first generating the underlying forecasts, whether they be "warm
and sunny" or "hurricane approaching the coast." The taxpayers have paid
for and demand both. His claim that NOAA is so distracted by trying to
"duplicate" his business that it would "wait for a hurricane to pass over a
city to then predict that there may be a hurricane to hit land," or fail to
attend to any of its warning responsibilities, is offensive to the
dedicated public servants who provide NOAA's services.

Most of NOAA's appropriations are devoted to developing environmental
information critical to the protection of lives and property, including
observing systems (satellites, radar, buoys and others), analyses, models,
forecasts, forecast interpretations, and warnings. Once this information
is developed, we disseminate it directly to all on equal terms, including
the taxpayers who paid for it.

Most commercial providers are heavy users of taxpayer-funded information,
much of it taken from the web, which they then use to create specialized
products and services for their various clients. NOAA does not do
this. Indeed, the National Research Council solicited examples from the
private sector, but found no instance of significant damage to private
sector interests. See Appendix D of the NRC's report "Fair Weather:
Effective Partnerships in Weather and Climate Services" (National Academies
Press, 2003). NOAA fosters the growth of the entire environmental
enterprise, including private providers, by distributing NOAA information
to all on equal terms, in multiple formats, and by multiple means
(including the Internet).

In summary:

Mr. Myers is correct that NOAA is "proud of its efforts during the
[tsunami] event." e are also hard at work improving our nation's systems
for tsunami warning and response and offering our expertise on a global
scale to improve humanity's ability to mitigate the destruction of future
tsunamis.

In general, we do not accept Mr. Myers' premise that NOAA "competes" with
the private sector or provides inappropriate services. We take seriously
the promise in the NOAA Partnership Policy to foster the growth of the
nation's environmental information enterprise as a whole to serve the
public interest.

If Mr. Myers believes NOAA provides information which is inappropriate, we
invite him to identify the specific services he objects to. In accord with
NOAA's Partnership Policy, we will give due consideration to his (or any
other) suggestion to terminate these services.

DL Johnson,
Brig Gen (ret)
Assistant Administrator for Weather Services,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

=================================
Message 1.3, from Barry Lee Myers
=================================

Dear Gary:

As you know, I submitted an email on February 16, 2005, to be sent out on
the AMS Private Sector listserv (AMS_PSL). entitled "TSUNAMI REPORT." The
email questioned NOAA's preparedness and response to the tsunami. As you
explained to me, you felt that my email contained information perhaps
"critical of others but otherwise appropriate."

You held up distribution of the email and provided NOAA an opportunity to
respond. NOAA did so on Friday, February 25, 2005.

Under the rules you have published, I now have the option of either
withdrawing my original email, which will then automatically withdraw
NOAA's response, or having both my original email and NOAA's response
issued to all on the AMS_PSL.

I believe the situation concerning NOAA's preparedness and priorities is of
great importance to the American weather enterprise and our nation.
Accordingly, I consent to having the email I previously submitted, and
pasted in below for convenience [RGR: The original message appears above;
the duplicate message has been deleted], along with NOAA's response, issued
to everyone on the AMS_PSL.

Please release these emails, along with this cover note explaining the
background of this situation.

Thank you, Gary, for your efforts.

Barry

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Best Wishes,
gary

===================================
Dr. R. Gary Rasmussen
Private Sector Coordinator
American Meteorological Society
45 Beacon Street
Boston, MA 02108-3693, USA
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E-Mail: <grasmussen@ametsoc.org>
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